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What Factors Affect The Time It Takes To Negotiate Faculty 
Collective Bargaining Agreements? 
 
Daniel J. Julius1 and Nicholas DiGiovanni, Jr.2 
 
Introduction 
This essay endeavors to answer two straight-forward but complex questions: how much 
time does it take to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement covering faculty in post-
secondary institutions, and what factors influence in the length of time involved? Are there any 
responses which will make sense? Can we offer any guidance? Permit first a few anecdotal 
stories and then a discussion about the internal and external factors that inform the answer to 
these questions and why the best answer may well be, “it depends.” 
In the early 1980’s when one of the authors was associated with a large state university 
system, a first-time faculty contract was bargained in three days. Impossible? Here’s the reason 
why that could possibly happen. A negotiator and a senior administrator then in charge 
determined to wrap up the settlement “in principle” because, among other reasons, they were not 
supportive of the person who was about to come in as the new vice president responsible for all 
human resources and labor relations. Sparing the reader the names and details to avoid any 
untoward reactions, these two individuals, “collaborated” with a bargaining agent representative 
in a manner which they thought would conclude a deal, solidify “their” positions in the system, 
and exclude the new vice president from the important decisions going forward.  
There were other mitigating circumstances to the story as well. For example, this was the 
first set of negotiations for this state system, and there were many political and variable 
dynamics between the campuses and the system office. In any event, the outline of an entire 
initial contract was set forth in principle on a single piece a paper. The new vice president, of 
course, suspected what was afoot (one reason why he was brought in) and within a short time the 
                                                 
1 Daniel J. Julius is Provost and Senior Vice President at New Jersey City University and former Visiting Scholar at 
the Center for Studies in Higher Education, University of California, Berkeley. 
 
2 Nicholas DiGiovanni Jr., Esq. is Partner in the labor and employment law firm of Morgan, Brown & Joy in Boston. 
He specializes in representing institutions of higher education and is currently counsel to numerous colleges and 
Universities, including Harvard, Tufts, Brandeis, the University of Vermont, the University System of New 
Hampshire, among many others. 
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negotiator and senior person who tried to pull off this side arrangement were gone. The first 
system-wide contract then took about another eight months to complete.3  
In another case from the late 1980s when one of the authors was associated with a large 
private university, the contract covering the law school faculty unit was traditionally negotiated 
routinely over lunch in a favored Chinese restaurant. All was signed, sealed and delivered within 
an hour. The opening position from the administration was: well, we might have to endeavor to 
amend the collective bargaining unit and add law school faculty into the full-time faculty unit—a 
proposal which was, of course, anathema to the law school faculty. The remainder of those 
luncheons were then focused on wrapping up a quick deal. That was the same conversation, for 
over a decade, and all on very good professional terms. 
On the other side of the time fence, it is well known that one renewal contract negotiated 
between the AAUP and the University of New Hampshire several years ago took almost three 
years to finalize, including two rounds of fact-finding. By the time it was done, there was two 
plus years of retroactive pay that had to be sorted out. But even longer was the initial contract at 
Seminole State College in Florida, which, according to reports, took well over five years to 
conclude! 
These are, of course, mere anecdotes and unusual stories to illustrate that anything can 
happen in negotiations, and in a world where the law does not dictate a fixed timeframe to 
complete the process, the parties can create their own timeframe—from a handful of hours to 
marathon events that would dwarf Hannibal’s long elephant march through the Alps!  
But in the normal world of collective bargaining, what factors can we identify that affect 
the length of time it takes to negotiate a faculty contract? 
Initial Collective Bargaining Agreement: Influencing Factors 
First of all, we must distinguish between first contracts and renewal agreements. As a 
general rule, it takes infinitely longer to negotiate an initial faculty collective bargaining 
agreement than it does with a renewal contract. While this may seem obvious, it is worth 
underlining the reasons for the difference. 
 
                                                 
3 The one-page three-day “agreement in principle” remains in my treasured notebook, coffee 
stains and all, hidden in my closet, it was important at the time. (DJ) 
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The Importance of First Contract Language 
Perhaps foremost on the list of special features of first-contract negotiations is the language 
of the contract itself and, simply put, getting this right takes an inordinate amount of time. It is 
axiomatic that the first contract is the most important in terms of contract language. Each side 
starts with no language in place, not even a title page. And from this void, an agreement 
governing the working conditions and compensation of hundreds of bargaining unit faculty must 
be chiseled and shaped. Moreover, since the provisions of a union contract do not easily change 
from one round to the next, the language that is negotiated into that first agreement is absolutely 
critical, especially on the key areas of the contract such as grievance procedures, management 
rights, standards of review for personnel decisions, and matters of academic judgment, to name a 
few. In many cases, language negotiated 20 years earlier will still survive in subsequent contracts 
without amendment. This is because of the burden in later rounds of making changes. The party 
coming forward with language changes in any future round bears a practical burden of 
persuasion, and gains that were hard fought in previous rounds will not be easily given back. For 
example, the establishment in a first contract of a “just cause” protection for discipline and 
discharge or the right to arbitrate grievances are provisions that are not likely to disappear in later 
rounds, and any administrative effort to take them back is likely to fall on deaf ears.  
Public-sector contracts are even more difficult to change from year to year due to the 
absence of the right to strike (in many states) and the substitution of other devises to resolve 
bargaining impasses. Under many public sector labor statutes, when impasse is reached, the 
parties may proceed to advisory fact finding or even binding arbitration. These processes are 
notoriously conservative, and most neutrals will not recommend wholesale changes in 
fundamental contract language, thus making it more difficult for a moving party to alter original 
contract provisions. None of this is absolute, of course, and language changes of some sort are 
made in every round of bargaining. But on the fundamental core provisions set in that initial 
round, the years only serve to cement their stature in the agreement. 
For such reasons, first contracts take time to complete. With no language in place, with 
skeptical and wary participants, and with all of the issues cited above, it is little wonder that the 
negotiations of most first contracts take well over a year. As bargaining proceeds, the time itself 
becomes a burden, taxing the schedules of the participants, the expenses of the institution, and 
the patience of all. The ability to understand this reality early will help an institution cope with 
the tedium, the frustration, and the periodic outbursts of tempers along the way. 
With all these considerations, among many others, looming before an institution, it is easy 
to understand the enormous pressures that weigh on a bargaining team and an administration as it 
goes into first-round bargaining with any new bargaining unit. 
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Developing the Relationship 
For better or worse, the introduction of a union changes the relationship between faculty 
and administration. The relationship is no longer bilateral but trilateral: the administration, the 
faculty, and the union. The administration must adjust to having a new political and legal entity 
on the campus with which it must deal on all matters affecting wages, hours, and working 
conditions and, in many cases, permissive subjects of bargaining as well such as governance. 
The adjustment takes time, but usually unions demand bargaining within weeks of their 
certification and thus the building of the relationship will begin to develop while the parties are 
in the midst of that first round of bargaining. This itself can slow down that first bargaining 
round with each party, like Sumo wrestlers, eyeing the other cautiously around the ring. 
First contracts, like treaties after a war, are often negotiated in strained and tense climates. 
In the aftermath of a union campaign, what may be remembered first is that both sides may have 
attacked the other in seeking votes. When the dust settles and the union has won, the 
administration may still be angered at the results and not inclined to make life any easier for the 
upstart labor organization. Unions, depending on their margin of victory, may come to the table 
with the arrogance of success and a mandate to improve the lot of the unit members. Or at the 
very least, they may come to the table determined to rectify the problems that led faculty to turn 
to them in the first place.  
Style and tone at the table, then, become critical elements in establishing the long-term 
relationship between the parties. That relationship will evolve from the way the two sides relate 
to one another during these early days and particularly how they conduct themselves at the 
bargaining table. Factors such as the ferocity of each side’s rhetoric, the demeanor of the 
negotiators, the nature of the proposals, the insistence on demands, the tone of the dialogue, and 
the way the parties handle the side issues that occur while bargaining the initial agreement will 
all take on particular meaning in that initial round. 
For such reasons, it takes time for everyone to catch their breath after the union campaign 
and decide how they want to approach each other—and that can slow down the process of 
negotiating that first agreement. 
Planning 
The key to effective negotiations starts with effective planning. Never is this more 
important than in the first contract negotiations and never does it take more time to do. In 
addition to the normal bargaining preparation and data collection that accompanies every round, 
the initial season at the table requires the development of a certain type of grand strategy and a 
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delineation of essential goals and principles that will guide the team and the administration 
through the months ahead. To accomplish this, an institution must set aside considerable periods 
of time to define and refine this strategy and to sketch out a broad vision of the future. 
As one example of this, administrators, in approaching an initial round of bargaining, will 
first want to consider whether they will have a particular overall stance to the bargaining itself. 
For example, will the administration simply seek to preserve the status quo and prevent the union 
from encroaching too much on management prerogatives? If so, it will be on the defensive most 
of the time, seeking to avoid substantive change wherever possible. 
On the other hand, the administration may pursue a more aggressive approach and propose 
major changes in the status quo. First contract negotiations may be seen as an opportunity to 
address problems of performance, productivity, governance, or economics that may not have 
been dealt with effectively in other settings4 An administration adopting this approach will be 
formulating major initiatives to present at the table—and these will take considerable time to 
deal with at the table. 
Beyond the broad picture, the administration will turn to particular themes and principles in 
preparing for bargaining. These can include many different concepts that vary depending on the 
nature of the bargaining unit. With a full-time faculty unit, concerns may extend to establishing 
or maintaining sound evaluation procedures, focusing on language that will enhance academic 
quality, defining the legitimate lines of governance, and restricting matters of academic judgment 
from arbitral review. With part-time faculty, the focus may be on keeping costs low, avoiding the 
extension of major benefits, and maintaining control of assignments as much as possible.  
With every bargaining unit, then, there will be special institutional aims that can be 
developed into operating principles in addressing many of the issues at the table. They will 
constitute the broad priorities as well as the reasoned underpinnings of the administration’s 
approach in the months ahead. This kind of planning neither seeks to define every piece of 
contract language with precision, nor does it set forth fixed tactics that must be followed week to 
week. Such matters should be left instead to the negotiators, who must be responsive to what the 
other side is doing, what circumstances develop, and what opportunities emerge. Instead, this 
pre-negotiations work on goals and principles can be important grounding for the institution and 
                                                 
4 As one recent example of this, the wave of new adjunct faculty bargaining units in the past few years has resulted 
in administrations, often for the first time, examining the method by which adjuncts are evaluated and realizing that 
there was often no clear oversight of the adjuncts’ performance. Thus, at the bargaining table, colleges and 
universities are themselves proposing more detailed and thoughtful evaluations procedures where none had 
previously existed. 
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can provide guidance on any particular issue. As the bargaining proceeds, it will be useful to 
refer to these principles periodically to make sure everyone is staying close to the charted course. 
Finally, the administration has to consider what it is willing to discuss at the table. While 
an administration is required to negotiate over wages, hours and working conditions under the 
National Labor Relations Act and virtually all public sector statutes, other issues of vital concern 
to faculty—such as governance issues—may be only permissive subjects of bargaining. This 
does not mean the administration is precluded from discussing those topics, but it does mean that 
it has to decide whether it wants to wade into those waters as part of the bargaining process. In 
addition, while an employer can always bail out of discussing permissive subjects in future 
rounds, the reality of the relationship is that if the administration discusses a permissive subject 
in the first round of bargaining, it will be hard pressed to extricate itself from such discussions in 
the next round. 
Data Collection 
The collection of data and information for collective bargaining is a time-consuming but 
necessary task. While this is true in every round of bargaining, first contracts are particularly 
difficult because there are often no templates in place to serve as a guide for obtaining the data. 
The administration has to figure out which department will be in charge of producing what 
information. What will the role of the Provost’s office be? Human Resources? Institutional 
Research? Academic Departments? Who will be responsible for what?  
Also, in many cases involving first contracts for adjunct faculty units, for example, 
administrations are not even sure who is in the unit or what information they have on such unit 
members, due to localized hiring of adjuncts by department chairs. In a first round of bargaining, 
just getting the information gathered is time consuming. This requires time-consuming 
questioning of the individual departments, the usual locus for such information. 
First Considerations at the Table: The Establishment of Initial Ground Rules 
Once the teams are at the table, where do you start? The very first consideration should be 
ground rules. Ground rules are sometimes not even considered as the parties approach 
bargaining, but they can be indispensable to a smooth first contract round and indeed for all 
subsequent rounds of negotiations. They establish, along with the legal framework, the rules by 
which the parties will play, and, once established in the first round, they often continue without 
major changes for future rounds. Thus, the first round again becomes an important test period 
and pinning down satisfactory ground rules can also take considerable time. 
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Among the many items to be considered here include: 
 
 Time lines for submission of initial proposals and possibly time lines for either reaching 
an agreement or reaching impasse; 
 
 The location of the meetings and frequency and times of meetings; 
 
 The number of people on each team; 
 
 Identification of the chief spokesperson; 
 
 Provisions for communications between the parties between sessions; 
 
 Understandings that articles may be T/A’d (tentative agreements) ; 
 
 Provision that nothing goes into effect until contract is ratified by both sides; 
 
 Provisions regarding who may or may not attend bargaining sessions; 
 
 Whether or not there will be any restrictions on press releases or other public 
statements about the bargaining; prior notice to the other side if one side or the other 
plans a press release and similar provisions; 
 
 Release time, with or without pay, for employees participating in bargaining; 
 
 Agreement to set agenda of an upcoming meeting at close of any given meeting; 
 
 Provisions as to the number of copies when materials are exchanged; 
 
 Sharing of expenses if bargaining takes place off-campus at hotel or other rented 
facilities; 
 
 General principles of civility and good faith to govern the bargaining affirmed by each 
side; 
 
 Understandings with regard to data requests; 
 
 Provisions for changing the rules by agreement. 
Once such ground rules are negotiating for a first agreement, they often simply get rubber 
stamped for future rounds. But again, for a first round, these take time. In summary and 
considering all of the factors above, it is little wonder that first contracts almost invariably take 
more than a year to negotiate under the best of conditions, and, coupled with some of the factors 
to be cited below, the process can easily span 18 or more months. 
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Subsequent Rounds of Bargaining: Influencing Factors 
Collective bargaining, especially with faculty units, is never easy, but subsequent rounds of 
bargaining are uniformly less difficult and less time-consuming than first rounds. In subsequent 
rounds, the parties have come to know each other. Each side knows the style of the other side, 
the people who will tend to guide the process, and the general approach and demeanor of the 
other side. In other words, the relationship has been formed, at least initially. 
Details such as ground rules require less time. Often previous ground rules are adopted 
with no changes, or perhaps only a tweak or two. Data collection has become more routine, with 
appropriate offices involved in the collection of particular data. The parties may have already 
established a timetable, either informally or in that first contract, as to when the renewal 
negotiations will start. Everything is simply more established. 
According to recent informal polling among higher education administrators who actually 
sit at bargaining tables, contract renewals usually take between four and ten months, with a 
number of rounds taking a year or more. It is typical at most institutions that bargaining will 
begin in January for contracts expiring in the summer, or some similar time frame. And yet, there 
can still be great variation in the time it takes to negotiate a successor contract. Why is this the 
case?  
Certainly, we can identify a series of factors that can, and do, directly influence the length 
of time it takes to negotiate a successor collective bargaining agreement. These include: 
The Adopted Style of Negotiations: Positional v. Interest Based  
As is well known, the two styles of bargaining normally in play are traditional positional 
bargaining and interest-based bargaining, with variations in between. This essay will not debate 
the two approaches except to underline that interest-based bargaining, if done correctly, will 
usually take much longer to negotiate than positional negotiations. This is due primarily to the 
need to confront every issue raised by each side (as opposed to simply saying no to a proposal) 
and, when so confronting an issue, allowing for brainstorming of ideas, various suggested 
options to deal with the issue, then measured against agreed upon criteria, and so on. Such a 
process is not designed for those who want to limit the time devoted to collective bargaining in a 
given year. 
Frequency of Meeting Times 
This is an obvious factor. Parties meeting once a week will get the work done quicker than 
those meeting once or twice a month.  
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Public Versus Private: the Statutory Framework.  
Here there is a tremendous difference between the private and public sector. In the private 
sector, under the umbrella of the National Labor Relations Act, either negotiations concludes 
with a settlement (perhaps with the help of a mediator) or there may be a strike. In contrast, 
public sector negotiations take place within a statutory framework where strikes may be 
prohibited and, instead, there are lengthy impasse procedures when the parties get stuck. For 
example, many state statutes provide that if negotiations fail, then a mediator must be appointed 
to assist and, if the parties still do not reach closure, then they proceed to advisory fact finding. 
This process can take months, as the fact finder must be first mutually agreed upon; a hearing 
date or dates must be set; briefs must be filed and decisions rendered. This process alone can 
easily take six months. Beyond that, in some sectors, there are steps beyond advisory fact 
finding, such as last best offers, that must be followed.5 In the public sector, then, such processes 
can drive a normal bargaining process well into a second year or more. 
Size and Composition of the Bargaining Team  
For example, the Service Employees International Union, in its recent surge of activity in 
organizing adjuncts and other contingent faculty in the Boston area would routinely have 
bargaining teams of 25 or more faculty at the sessions, each with the ability to participate. 
Inevitably, this delays the process as more individuals find the necessity to speak. This is 
opposed to tightly circumscribed union bargaining teams of five or six faculty members with a 
chief spokesperson. While smaller teams may not mean a quicker pace any more than large ones 
slow it down, the number of people involved in the process can be a factor. 
The Subjects on the Table 
Certainly, a bargaining round with an abundance of complex issues will inevitably take 
longer to negotiate whereas limited-scope bargaining, under which the parties agree in advance 
to limit the number of articles to be opened or the number of issues to be raised can expedite the 
process. When both sides want to avoid an excessively long bargaining season, they may mutual 
agree to follow this approach.  
                                                 
5 In Vermont, following fact finding, each party must submit, as a single package, its last best offer on all disputed 
items to the Vermont Labor Relations Board who must then pick either the union’s package taken as a whole with 
no amendments, or the administration’s package, taken as a whole with no amendments. 3 V.S.A. Section 901 et 
seq. 
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Parties Control over the Subjects 
Further complicating the negotiations may be the degree to which the parties control—or 
don’t control—the resolution of the issues. Some issues at the table may be beyond the authority 
of the team and rest instead on external agencies. For example, in the public sector, does the state 
legislature control or otherwise have to approve financial packages, or does the institution have 
the autonomy to chart its own course? Where the state controls, the parties may reach some 
tentative understandings, but the state legislature may take months to ratify or appropriate the 
money to fund the agreement.  
The Nature of the Bargaining Unit and Degree of Conflict or Cooperation Among Primary 
Constituencies in the Unit 
This can be an issue when the unit is particularly broad, such as when there is a mixture of 
tenured/tenure-track faculty mingled with non-tenure track, contingent faculty. The views of one 
group may not mirror the views of other groups. Indeed, a classic example of this is the desire of 
many full-time faculty unions to limit the number of part-time or otherwise contingent faculty at 
the institution. When the unit includes both contingent faculty and tenured faculty, the interests 
of the two groups can be in conflict, creating delays. A problem can also occur in a multi-campus 
system where negotiators are trying to take into account the particular interests and needs of the 
different campuses. The relationship of “local power brokers” to system decision makers often 
proves to be determinative; 
The Relationship of Local Union Representatives to National Representatives 
At times, the relationship between local and state/national union officials can affect a 
number of issues. The best interests of one may not mesh with the best interests of the other. For 
example, an aggressive national union may insist on certain provisions for the local agreement—
such as a union shop—that may hamper the ability of the local union to complete negotiations. 
The Agenda of Negotiator, Administration, or Union 
This is broader than the particular proposals on the table. For labor, this may depend on 
why and in what manner the union agent was elected in the first place. For example, the primary 
impetus may be to act as a hedge against what was perceived as arbitrary and high-handed 
management actions, as a way to safeguard gains made prior to unionization and which may now 
be perceived to be in jeopardy. or as a defense against system-wide incursion into local affairs. Is 
this a situation where one agent challenges another, and wins an election, and must now 
demonstrate greater prowess at the table to a “new” membership? On the management side, an 
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administration may have an aggressive agenda that it knows it won’t achieve at the table but 
plans to assert during the impasse proceedings. 
The Lead Negotiator 
In some cases, the lead negotiator becomes the problem in terms of the time it takes to 
negotiate. A new negotiator for one side or the other may enter the round of bargaining seeking 
to undo what his or her predecessor did at the table. A new union leader may think that the 
previous union negotiator was too soft, or too compliant with the administration’s wishes and 
may now seek to assert the union’s agenda in an aggressive fashion that forces the parties into 
impasse and slows down the process.  
On the other hand, a thoughtful and experienced negotiator may become an asset in moving 
the process along, counseling his or her side to make reasonable responses to the other side’s 
needs, achieving fair compromises and finding ways to settle issues that may have seemed 
impossible to resolve. 
The Economic Climate 
Bargaining in tight economic times is a challenge and can often elongate the process. A 
union facing a management position of either no compensation increases or maybe a 1% 
increase, for example, will have no incentive to settle quickly and, in the public sector, may 
simply decide to move into the longer statutory impasse procedures.  
The Relative Strength of the Unit 
A unit of tenured/tenure-track faculty generally holds more sway than newly formed units 
of adjunct faculty. Administrations may be more concerned about their full-time tenure-stream 
faculty and be willing to engage in longer negotiations over more issues than it might with 
contingent faculty. However, the current climate, where adjuncts and full-time contingent faculty 
units are numerous and developing into a force, may eventually change that equation. 
The Ability of the President or the Board of Trustees to Sustain Conflict with the Union, 
with Internal Constituencies, or to Survive “Negative Press” 
Simply put, some administrations and boards of trustees are willing to weather a long siege 
to maintain their position and not yield to union demands. Others may eventually not want the 
distraction of an unresolved contract and will fold on issues at some point just to get the process 
over with. This can also include the relationship of the president to his or her senior leadership 
team and generally whether the president is secure or feels at risk.  
11
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Continuity, or Lack Thereof, of Administrators 
It sometimes is the case that a new president, or provost, is hired in the middle of a round 
of bargaining. The new administrator may have sharply different views from his or her 
predecessor, and, depending on what those views are and how they contrast with the previous 
administration, the negotiating process can be suddenly cut short through concessions or 
elongated through defiance. 
Additional factors include: 
 
 The degree to which settlement will advance the career of one individual or another or 
advance the interests of a particular constituency; 
 
 The degree to which one party or the other needs or desires to test the strength of the 
other; 
 
 What other agreements unions in the area or region have made and whether pattern 
bargaining plays a role and how much support the bargaining union will receive from 
other unions on campus; 
 
 The process for contract ratification; 
 
 Luck, serendipity, time of year, and the health of individuals at the table; 
 
 The extent to which one party feels coming to agreement may hurt institutional prestige 
or set a pattern for other institutions (a city or region). 
The list above is fairly comprehensive, and yet, we would be hard pressed to answer a 
question concerning in what manner these factors and variables shorten or extend the length of 
negotiations. For example, the experience of the negotiator, size and composition of bargaining 
teams, the authority of negotiators all matter but to what extent? An experienced negotiator will 
know under what conditions settlement is possible but may be prevented from doing so by other 
variables identified in this essay. Research is needed in post-secondary settings on the effect of 
personality, organizational, political or structural variables that impact negotiations in a 
“positive” or “negative” manner assuming anyone can come to an agreement on the definition of 
those terms. 
While first contracts invariably take longer to negotiate, successor agreements can be as 
problematic as first-time contracts. For example, if the parties are confined to economic items 
only, there may be less opportunity to trade non-economic issues for economics and vice versa. 
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By and large, it is sometimes easier, in our experience, to have both economic and non-economic 
issues on the table; the art of negotiations demands that tradeoffs be made (or at least feigned).  
Moreover, there are strategies negotiators employ to enhance leverage which may make 
negotiations for successor agreements an easier or more difficult affair. For example, inserting 
language that mandates arbitration procedures expire, let’s say a month before the actual 
agreement terminates, can, in some jurisdictions leave one party without recourse to arbitration 
until a new contract is agreed upon and ratified. A situation such as this can, in some cases, cause 
pressure to settle, as can a strike or a lockout. There are other ways to enhance leverage and such 
strategies require sophistication and a knowledgeable “long- term view” of negotiations 
processes. 
While legal and organizational environments differ, and the politics of organizations and 
personalities of leaders are always interesting, we would argue the private sector affords 
employer representatives with greater legal flexibility and leverage in negotiations. Whether or 
not the negotiators take advantage of that leverage is another story, and sometimes it may not be 
wise to take advantage of such. There is an old adage, that good legal advice may not be good 
academic advice. While a party can triumph at the bargaining table through a strike or lockout, 
negative press, attitudes of students, and public opinion often leave deep institutional scars. 
Animosity resulting from a strike or lockout may last for years, ripping the fabric of the 
academic community and replacing civility with cynicism and anger.  
Ultimately, students suffer, and the institution has a much harder time recruiting talented 
faculty and staff. In our experience the next president after such actions occur will inevitably be 
asked to start anew with a different team. In academic organizations, as in other highly political 
contexts, the heroes of a strategy that lead to particular outcomes in one era, may be scapegoated 
over time, when the unintended consequences of labor relations actions are then blamed on those 
who were given accolades and credit for what originally transpired. Bargaining is a cyclical 
process, and one would do well to approach it with caution, foresight, and a long-term view 
about bargaining gains and losses. This is true for union as well as employer representatives.  
The truth is that regardless of negotiating positions and bargaining outcomes, in academic 
organizations the parties must still engage in shared governance of some kind in post-bargaining 
relationships. Conditions that pre-dated bargaining can be exacerbated if negotiations and 
settlements are not addressed in an effective, respectful, and fair manner. After the ratification 
vote, the parties have to live with each other again; trust and respect must be nourished. In this 
regard, labor relations dynamics in colleges and universities really are different than in many 
other industries and organizations. 
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The appended charts depict the dimensions of negotiations. They provide some insight into 
why the process can sometimes drag on for months and even years. Charts 1 through 66 depict 
the dimensions of labor relations and constituents who impact collective bargaining processes 
and outcomes. Knowing the “dimensions” is a sina qua non for understanding how the process is 
influenced and, as well, the impact of the variables identified which are associated with the 
length of negotiation processes. 
Imperatives on Negotiators to Manage the Process 
As good practitioners we conclude this essay by providing readers with questions they 
might consider as they “manage “or navigate the negotiations process. One caveat is clear; those 
who negotiate must prepare their team, constituencies, and the senior leadership for what will 
transpire at the bargaining table. Presidents need information and need to be prepared to respond 
when trustees, legislators, or community leaders ask why the institution cannot settle with the 
union. In worst case scenarios, senior academic leaders, including the president, look inept and 
unattached to reality (and because of this, lose authority and prestige) when they are unable to 
respond intelligently to important internal or external constituencies on the question of the length 
of negotiations. We have witnessed cases where important external stakeholders lost faith in 
internal leaders because they did not understand negotiation strategies and tactics and instead 
perceived the process to be adrift. We count among our friends chief negotiators who lost their 
positions by failing to provide the information and evidence that the negotiating process was 
being managed correctly; all of which is related to the question of the length of negotiations. 
Explaining contract negotiations and the variables and factors that effect negotiations to 
presidents or chancellors or faculty constituencies, who may be asking for a rational approach 
and a realistic timeframe to wrap up negotiations, is imperative for chief spokespersons who seek 
a long career and the ability to retain the power and influence needed to be effective.  
Our experience suggests that bargaining is still dependent on a multiplicity of variables and 
factors. Knowing which ones are most salient will help determine answers to the original 
questions which generated this essay; which, by the way, is still, “it depends.” 
                                                 
6 The appended charts, Dimensions of Collective Bargaining, were, to the best of our knowledge, originally 
developed for training programs by the U.S. Department of Labor in the 1940’s or 1950’s. We have adapted them 
for use in higher education and have been using them since the 1970’s. They were most recently published in D. 
Julius and N. DiGiovanni, “Academic Collective Bargaining: On Campus Fifty Years “Center for Studies in Higher 
Education, Research and Occasional Paper Series, University of California, Berkeley, April 2013. 
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